By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This ebook proposes an unique idea of epistemic justification that provides a brand new option to relate justification to the epistemic target of truth-conducive trust. the speculation relies on a singular research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a manner of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation don't need to be justificatory while systemic deception may be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification needs to be obtainable to the believer, whereas protecting the fundamental connection of justification to truth.
The research exhibits how justification pertains to, yet is distinctive from, proof, rationality, and likelihood. It offers a unifying therapy of concerns critical to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the influence of good fortune on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical review of epistemological theories. There are extra purposes to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technology, and ethics.
The ebook will interact philosophers operating in epistemology or comparable fields, and their graduate students.
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Additional resources for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
Naturally, the deontologist thinks that believing in accord with the internalized standards that impose epistemic duties is truth-conducive. He may counter that the point of satisfying deontological constraints on belief is to get truth. But what is noteworthy is that in justifying one’s belief one does not attempt to show that deontological constraints have been satisfied. One argues that one’s belief conforms to the world, not to one’s standards. These considerations seem to me to favor a conception of epistemic justification that connects directly with truth.
The reliability of a process, understood subjunctively, does not require that truths result in high proportion or with high probability. Nozick’s version does carry this consequence, but mine does not. The difference results from further conditions he adds, and from the absence from his version of my restriction to normalcy. As Nozick seeks conditions for knowledge, the issue of the desirability of this consequence does not arise for him. He needs a truth condition anyway, so he can let the probability of getting truth be 1.
One may incorrectly assess one’s performance without this mistake constituting or reflecting a failure to act dutifully. Although obligation implies ability, blamelessly believing one is obligated does not imply ability. It is not plausible to impose, whenever there is a duty to do x, a further duty to tell, correctly no less, that one has done x. The physician may have a duty to do all he can to save his patient, and doing all he can is certainly within his abilities. But need he be able to determine that what he has done for the patient is all that he can do, that no further measure would avail?